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‘Big D’ and ‘little d’: two types of twenty-first century 
development?
David Lewis 
department of Social Policy, london School of economics & Political Science, london, uK
ABSTRACT
Confusion between the idea of development as purposeful intervention 
and development as outcome has been addressed by efforts to distin-
guish ‘intentional’ from ‘immanent’ development, and the distinction 
between ‘big D’ development as Western post- World War Two mod-
ernisation in the Global South, and ‘little d’ as the creation of winners 
and losers within unfolding capitalist change. As a heuristic device this 
distinction has been put to a variety of uses within development studies, 
but it has rarely been subjected to further scrutiny. This paper asks (1) 
whether the distinction remains coherent or risks being stretched too 
far, and (2) whether it remains relevant within the changing landscape 
of twenty-first century development. It first traces the historical evolu-
tion of the distinction, and then presents an exploratory case study of 
Bangladesh’s garment sector in order to analyse the relationship 
between the two kinds of development empirically, identifying a num-
ber of contradictions and ambiguities. It finds that while the ‘D/d’ dis-
tinction remains useful at a general level, further conceptualisation is 
now needed, and its relevance may fade as the significance of Western 
aid declines.
1. Introduction
Although the term is ubiquitous, there are continuing debates about exactly what is meant 
by ‘development’. We might easily agree with Bruce Currie-Alder et al.’s basic definition that 
development is ‘how societies change over time’, but this still leaves open important ques-
tions of how and why they change.1 Heinz Arndt helpfully distinguished between two main 
meanings: development as something that is done (and therefore involves intention and 
choice) and development as something that happens (occurring according to some kind of 
largely predetermined ex ante logic).2 Confusion arises because the word ‘development’ is 
sometimes used to refer to change and its consequences, while other times it refers to the 
intentions of institutional actors to bring change about. For example, the term may be var-
iously used to refer to broad processes of economic and social transformation, particularly 
under capitalism; to describe conditions in particular areas or countries and the levels of 
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2 D. LEWIS
‘progress’ that they contain; or simply to refer to the international activities of aid agencies 
and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
Two related conceptualisations have been used to try to address this problem. First was 
Michael Cowen and Robert W. Shenton’s historical enquiry into ‘the invention of develop-
ment’ as both an idea and as practice, and the ambiguities around its different meanings. 
They proposed a clearer distinction between development as ‘immanent process’ and ‘inten-
tional practice’, having identified the source of the problem as confusion between devel-
opment as unfolding societal change and development ‘as a goal of action’.3 They argued 
that the concept of intentional development had originally emerged from the recognition 
during the nineteenth century of ‘the essential unity of creation and destruction contained 
within the process of development’, and that it had primarily been conceived as a tool for 
managing the disorder produced by capitalist transformation, underpinned by a concept 
of ‘trusteeship’ that assumed the government’s role and good judgment in protecting the 
welfare of its citizens.4
The second conceptualisation was human geographer Gillian Hart’s well-known distinc-
tion between ‘Development’, which she characterised as the conscious efforts of develop-
ment agencies to intervene and promote positive change, and ‘development’, the wider 
patterns of societal change that produces both winners and losers from struggles around 
power and resources.5 For Hart this distinction was productive because it enabled a more 
fully historicised analysis of contemporary neoliberal capitalism and global power, and 
potentially offered insight into how dominant discourses could be challenged and alternative 
development paths constructed. Hart’s ‘D/d’ distinction was taken up in various ways within 
development studies. It helped provide a simple framing device for introductory teaching 
in development, informed debates about theory and practice in development, and it has 
been used to challenge managerial and technical approaches to development that pay 
insufficient attention to politics, context and history.6 For example, Sharad Chari and Stuart 
Corbridge describe the post-1945 era as one in which ‘Development was capitalised’ and 
turned into ‘something that governments and private companies direct, perhaps in combi-
nation with leading global agencies like the World Bank’.7 More specifically, the distinction 
has informed critical work on NGOs where it is has been argued that such organisations 
should work politically to build alliances for structural change within ‘little d’ processes rather 
than focus only on ameliorative ‘big D’ projects.8
While the ‘D/d’ distinction has gained traction, it has been subjected to relatively little 
further scrutiny. Nor has it been applied empirically. On closer inspection, there are some 
potential problems. First, there are areas of conceptual ambiguity. For example, while the 
‘big D’ idea captures the way the international aid system imposes policy agendas on depen-
dent countries in the Global South, what about countries whose policy regimes are less 
connected to the aid system? Second, how are ‘little d’ and ‘big D’ development related to 
each other in practice? For example, if ‘big D’ or ‘little d’ are presented as strategic alternatives 
for NGOs, do we risk dualist thinking that undermines Hart’s original conceptualisation of a 
dialectical relationship between the two types?9 The aim of this paper is to reflect on two 
main questions. The first is whether the utility of the ‘D/d’ distinction risks being stretched 
too far beyond simply a general usefulness as a means of organising ideas about develop-
ment? The second is to ask whether a conceptual distinction that emerged at the turn of 
the millennium under specific historical conditions can remain relevant in today’s changing 
development landscape?
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The first part of the paper traces the evolution of the ‘D/d’ distinction. The second part 
explores how far the concept has travelled within development studies and the ways it has 
been put to use, focusing in particular on discussions of NGOs and civil society. The third 
part applies the concept to the case of the Bangladesh garment industry in the light of these 
two questions. This makes it possible to examine ambiguities in the way the relationship 
between two types is framed, which are analysed in the fifth section. The conclusion then 
returns to the two central questions. In answer to the first, it finds that the distinction serves 
as a useful ideal type but becomes less stable when applied empirically. Specifically, it iden-
tifies the problem that ‘D/d’ relationships and goals are ambiguous among actors at the 
interface where this dialectic unfolds. Second, it suggests with the declining importance of 
Western aid and the growth of multipolar patterns of global transformation, the utility of 
the ‘D/d’ distinction is likely to be reduced.
2. The genealogy of the ‘D/d’ distinction
A common criticism of development studies is that it is ‘depthless and ahistorical’.10 Cowen 
and Shenton addressed this problem by examining and reasserting the importance earlier 
ideas and assumptions that lie behind contemporary debates.11 They suggested that, his-
torically, there have been two main ways of thinking about how societies develop and 
change: (1) faith in unfolding progress through which societies advance and peoples’ lives 
improve, and (2) the reformist idea of state action to minimise the undesirable consequences 
of capitalism and bring order to processes of disruptive change. Nineteenth century indus-
trialisation in Europe produced what they identified as a historically specific ‘doctrine of 
development’ that linked these two understandings through the principle of ‘trusteeship’. 
This principle was based on the idea of the state managing issues of poverty, urban migration 
and unemployment, an essentially paternalistic idea that was later extended from the domes-
tic realm into colonial territories.
Cowen and Shenton’s thesis was that the modern idea of development emerged originally 
from the need to manage instability within Europe’s rapidly industrialising societies. It 
referred to state practice intended to counter dislocation brought about by progress: ‘it was 
in Europe that development was first meant to create order out of the social disorder of 
rapid urbanization, poverty and unemployment’.12 Influenced by French philosopher August 
Comte’s ideas, development was originally understood as a rational means ‘to ameliorate 
the disordered faults of progress’.13 Furthermore, as European empires grew, colonial coun-
tries came to see themselves as sufficiently ‘developed’ that ‘they could act to determine the 
process of development for others deemed less-developed’, drawing further on the doctrine 
of trusteeship as the principal means through which this could be achieved.14 This under-
standing has continued to inform contemporary theory and practice, extending a view of 
development in which the goal of development is understood as an expression of policy.
Cowen and Shenton’s work also showed that the historical evolution of ideas about devel-
opment was more complex than was often understood. It highlighted the fact that echoes 
of these earlier ideas lingered on, rarely acknowledged, within the world of development. 
For example, they questioned the assumption that uS President Truman’s famous 1949 pres-
idential speech inaugurated the modern concepts of ‘development’ and ‘underdevelopment’, 
observing that the nineteenth century trusteeship principle could still be seen as informing 
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contemporary ideas about technology transfer, good governance, local level participation 
and empowerment.15 Far from having been discredited as Eurocentric and paternalistic during 
the era of decolonisation, it had also influenced the establishment of the Bretton Woods 
institutions and the 1980s policies of ‘structural adjustment’ imposed on the Global South.16
Cowen and Shenton also suggested that confusion between the means and goals of 
development was continuing to create problems for development studies now that earlier 
distinctions between immanent process and intentional practice had become blurred:
… the question of how actions taken in the name of development relate to any preconceived 
end of development is unanswered. Furthermore, because development is both means and 
goal, the final outcome is routinely assumed to be present at the onset of the process of 
development.17
Nor was a clear enough distinction usually made, they argued, between a state policy for 
development and efforts to empower people ‘through or indeed against the state’ in pursuit 
of development.
A few years later, Gillian Hart built on Cowen and Shenton’s work by creating a related 
but slightly different conceptualisation: the ‘D/d’ distinction.18 In seeking to challenge claims 
that were increasingly being made during the 1990s by both ‘the neoliberal right and the 
cultural left’ that the idea of development was dead (to be replaced respectively either by 
free market forces or by alternatives brought about by new social movements), she countered 
by suggesting that development remained a powerful field of ideas and practices charac-
terised by ‘multi-layered struggles’.19 She argued that the best way to understand this was 
through making a distinction between
‘big D’ Development defined as a post-second world war project of intervention in the ‘third 
world’ that emerged in the context of decolonization and the cold war, and ‘little d’ develop-
ment or the development of capitalism as a geographically uneven, profoundly contradictory 
set of historical processes.20
While there were strong echoes of Cowen and Shenton, Hart’s framing went further by 
drawing on Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation and its critique of what he termed the 
market society. In particular she drew on his concept of the ‘double movement’ that served 
to check the market’s expansion. This idea referred to the contradictions that produced forms 
of resistance such as trade unions, civil society organisations and social movements seeking 
to reshape capitalism. Polanyi understood this double movement as arising from potentially 
productive ‘countertendencies’ contained within capitalism, based on ‘the clash of the organ-
ising principles of economic liberalism and social protection’.21 The resulting contestations 
revolved around struggles for social protection, such as improved labour standards, equal 
rights and social justice within the harsh processes of industrialisation and modernisation.
Polanyi had predicted the end of the market model of economy as a result of its tendencies 
to neglect society and social relationships. After the two World Wars and the Great Depression 
of the 1930s such a breakdown seemed plausible, but with the emergence of social democ-
racy after 1945 in many capitalist countries it failed to materialise. He had underestimated 
the capacity of national level policies such as the New Deal and Keynesian state interven-
tionism to maintain stability.22 Nevertheless, his overall analysis of the damage to societies 
caused by an increased reliance on market models remains persuasive. Polanyi’s ideas were 
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lent a new resonance from the end of the 1970s by the ‘neoliberal’ policies of Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan that brought a revival of market capitalism and the rolling back 
of the state. Following the 2008 financial crash, the façade of neoliberalism has been increas-
ingly questioned and resisted: ‘furnish[ing] plentiful material for Polanyi’s thesis that the 
neglect of social interests must eventually generate a political backlash and a retreat from 
market fundamentalism’.23
Gillian Hart’s ‘D/d’ distinction can also be understood as operating within a specific his-
torical context. She was writing during the post-Cold War 1990s, when structural adjustment 
policies were being followed by triumphalist proclamations about ‘the end of history’ and 
claims about the natural dominance of liberal capitalism and markets. Hart aimed to reclaim 
the ground from neoliberal globalists by reasserting the role of the developmental state, 
and by thinking more critically about power, struggle and structure:
The key issue, rather, is the need to confront questions of capitalist development – not as 
unfolding teleology or immanent process, but in terms of the multiple, non-linear, intercon-
nected trajectories that are constitutive of what has come, euphemistically, to be termed ‘glo-
balization’. Refocusing on ‘small d’ development, and on non-reductionist understandings of 
class and power, constitutes a vitally important terrain for intellectual engagement in a world 
of profound injustice and material inequality.24
Hart’s original formulation of the idea was brief and made almost in passing, but she has 
returned to it several times and developed it further. For example, in a discussion of the 
South African government’s changing attitudes towards development, Hart refers to the 
distinction to locate her analysis more firmly within a historical political economy perspec-
tive.25 The desire to examine the present through a historical analysis of capitalism and 
development was also in evidence in an Antipode article written following the 2008 global 
financial crisis.26 Here she returned to the idea in her analysis of how changing post-World 
War Two understandings of development can ‘shed light on the conditions in which we now 
find ourselves’. She now offered the following elaborated definition:
‘Big D’ Development I define as the multiply scaled projects of intervention in the ‘Third World’ 
that emerged in the context of decolonization struggles and the Cold War. ‘Little d’ develop-
ment refers to the development of capitalism as geographically uneven but spatially intercon-
nected processes of creation and destruction, dialectically interconnected with discourses and 
practices of Development.27
This refinement is a helpful one. The fact that interventions are understood as ‘multiply 
scaled’ makes clearer the diversity of ‘big D’ activities, from regional World Bank structural 
adjustment policies to small-scale NGO local projects. The relationship between the two 
types of development is also now more explicitly specified as ‘dialectically interconnected’. 
Finally, she also clarifies the historical distinctiveness of ‘big D’ development as the post-
1945 Western international modernisation project that took shape in the contexts of 
decolonisation and Cold War tensions.28 In this way, her idea differs from Cowen and 
Shenton’s broader view that the idea of ‘intentional’ development can be historically 
located in the broader management of change in European modernising and colonising 
societies.
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3. How far has the distinction evolved and contributed  
to development studies?
While the origin of the ‘D/d’ distinction is found in historical analyses of development, as 
briefly discussed earlier, it has also been applied by development scholars in several ways 
that go beyond this.
The first is its use in helping to broaden understandings of development beyond a narrow 
view of projects, programmes and policies. For example, Alan Thomas draws on Cowen and 
Shenton to investigate the problem that development is too narrowly defined as ‘what devel-
opment agencies do’ and that ‘development practice has come to be the dominant meaning 
of development’.29 The field of development studies is diverse, with some university depart-
ments focusing their research on wider development as transformation, while others – partly 
driven by resource pressures that can be met by consultancy – pursue more ‘applied’ research 
agendas in partnership with development agencies. Thomas is unhappy with a limited view 
of development as practice, claiming that it obscures development’s complexity and ambi-
guities. Though he does not engage with Hart’s distinction explicitly, he draws on Polanyi’s 
refutation of the idea that ‘the development of capitalism accords to some kind of natural 
historical law’, and argues instead that ‘the conditions for global capitalism have constantly 
to be promoted by those political forces which favour them’.30 Thomas’ argument extends 
Polanyi’s idea of the double movement that operates at the level of states to also include 
struggles between civil society organisations and corporate interests. The paper can also be 
read as a contribution to overcoming the earlier ‘impasse’ faced in development studies, in 
which scholars concerned with theory and practice found themselves unable to communi-
cate meaningfully with each other.31
The ‘D/d’ distinction has also been used by those who argue that we need to resist purely 
technical approaches to development by insisting on the need to bring in politics. 
Conceptions of development intervention that focus only on managing institutional capacity 
building, service delivery, infrastructure and public administration reform can be understood 
as reformist interventions that do not address underlying processes of capitalist (or indeed 
socialist) development, paying insufficient attention to alternative ways of organising polit-
ical, economic and social relationships. The distinction therefore informs resistance to con-
temporary pressures towards the narrow ‘what works’ approach to development – essentially 
a dominant contemporary framing of ‘big D’ – that reduces it to measurable local level inter-
ventions at the expense of power, politics and structural change. It also has implications for 
the deepening of development as practice, as for example the argument that development 
organisations that engage with ‘little d’ development through lobbying to change the struc-
tural causes of poverty and mobilising against injustice have more relevance than those 
who simply carry out ‘big D’ in the form of small-scale projects or delivering contracted 
services on behalf of states and donors.32
A third application is in relation to the role of NGOs as civil society organisations, where 
the ‘D/d’ distinction has helped to frame analysis of the relationship between NGOs and the 
pursuit of ‘alternative’ approaches to development. Bebbington et al. see its value as ‘offering 
a means to better clarify relationships between development policy and practice and the 
underlying processes of uneven development that create exclusion and inequality for many 
just as they led to enhanced opportunities for others’.33 Development NGOs have in many 
cases provided alternative ideas and approaches – such as community level service delivery, 
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participatory project planning or microfinance – at the level of ‘big D’ interventions. But they 
have been less ready to contribute more radical alternatives at ‘little d’ level, where the focus 
needs to be on ‘alternative ways of organising the economy, politics and social relationships 
in a society’. This, the authors suggest, is partly due to the location of many development 
NGOs within the broader world of aid and agencies, where they pay insufficient attention 
to wider political economy and lack critical engagement with the structural questions such 
engagement would imply. They comment on Cowen and Shenton’s original framework by 
suggesting that not only is it necessary to distinguish these two different ways of thinking, 
but also to connect them by addressing ‘the clear, if non-deterministic, relationships between 
these two dimensions of development’.34
Jonathan Rigg’s reflections on modernisation and development in Southeast Asia offer 
a further conceptual refinement. Taking the original idea of ‘big D’ as managed economic 
change in the form of ‘funds, technologies and expert advice, much of it from the rich world’ 
directed to the poor countries, and ‘little d’ as the ‘historical progress of capitalism’, he goes 
on to propose two new sub-distinctions within the ‘big D’ category:
In thinking of the different ‘developments’ that exist we can take these distinctions a little fur-
ther and add two more to the list: superscript development (Dd) and subscript development 
(Dd). Dd refers to the role played by developmental states in driving and directing development 
in the Asian region … This is substantially different from the ‘big D’ development to which 
Hart refers. Dd on the other hand, relates to the role of NGOs and community organizations 
in promoting change. This is more usually termed alternative development … The point of 
drawing out development typologies in this way is that it helps to contextualize – intellectu-
ally – different critiques of development. The post-developmentalists, for example, are usually 
directed [sic] their ire at ‘big D’ development and see Dd as a possible way out of the develop-
ment impasse.35
This modification helps make clearer the relationship between the two types of development 
by distinguishing different tendencies at the point where they intersect. It highlights different 
forms of ‘big D’ activity and the nature of the dialectic and draws our attention to an interface 
between the two, where there are entanglements of state, market and civil society. In order 
to investigate these issues further, the next section applies our analysis of the ‘D/d’ concep-
tualisation to a brief case study of the garment industry in Bangladesh.
4. The Bangladesh garment industry
The ready-made garment industry in Bangladesh offers a ‘real world’ case in which these 
two framings of development can be more fully explored. The case is primarily based on 
secondary sources, but also draws on previous qualitative work by the author.36 It is intended 
as an ‘exploratory’ case study that enables us to achieve a depth of analysis that might allow 
a refining and further development of the conceptualisation.37 At the same time, it is 
acknowledged that application to another country case setting might reveal a different set 
of issues in relation to the ‘D/d’ concept. The example of Bangladesh is particularly illumi-
nating because it shows clearly how both ‘big D’ and ‘little d’ processes play out, how they 
each contribute in significant ways to both economic and social development, and how 
the relationship between them is not straightforward and contains certain contradictions. 
On the one hand, Bangladesh as long been a country on the receiving end of foreign aid 
and intensive external development interventions. On the other, Bangladesh’s garment 
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sector emerged in relatively short period of time to become by far the most dynamic area 
of the country’s economy such that it has ‘directly fuelled Bangladesh’s development’.38
The modern garment industry in Bangladesh specialises in the manufacture of clothes 
mainly for Western retailers, and its factories rely mostly on low cost female labour. Worth 
around uS$7 million in 1982, the sector employed 1.5 million workers by 1999 and contrib-
uted three-quarters of Bangladesh’s uS$5 billion total exports. By 2017 the garment indus-
try’s turnover had risen to an estimated uS$28.1 billion.39 More than half of exports go to 
the Eu, around one-quarter to the uS, and the rest to countries such as Canada and Japan. 
The rise of the garment industry has been described as ‘the most remarkable economic 
development in Bangladesh in the past two decades’.40 It has been one of the key drivers of 
the country’s transition from 1970s ‘basket case’ to achieving in 2015 of the status of ‘low-
er-middle-income country’.41
The sector’s origins date back to the late 1970s, when a handful of factories began pro-
ducing clothes for Western markets as a consequence of the 1974 Multi-Fibre Arrangement 
(MFA). This arrangement was put in place by the developed countries in order to protect 
their clothing manufacturers from growing quantities of cheap imports from developing 
countries, using strict export quotas. Although the MFA was primarily designed to protect 
European and North American producers, it also provided opportunities to very poor coun-
tries such as Bangladesh.42 under this agreement, it became possible for established gar-
ment-producing countries to extend their production by activating the unused export 
quotas of non-garment producing poor countries. Textile production had once been an 
important sector during Bengal’s pre-colonial past, but there was no pre-existing export 
garment industry in Bangladesh. It was South Korean capital, a country whose quotas were 
already filled, that served as the catalyst for the emergence of this new industrial sector.
The dramatic growth of the industry was also driven by cheap labour and low infrastruc-
ture costs. Wage rates in Bangladesh have remained among the lowest in the world, and 
labour force entry requires little formal education or capital requirements. Investors can rent 
factory space very cheaply. As a result, the country’s garments are 40–100% cheaper than 
Chinese counterparts in European markets and 30–70% cheaper in uS markets. Furthermore, 
domestic policy reform, chiefly the liberalisation of trade, including measures such as the 
back-to-back ‘letter of credit’ system43 and bonded warehouse facility,44 have been crucial 
in helping to facilitate sector growth.45
Industry growth has generated far-reaching social and economic changes in Bangladesh. 
By the early 2000s, more than a million women had entered the formal sector industrial 
workforce in the country’s main cities of Dhaka and Chittagong, and today’s figure is nearer 
to four million. This change has taken place despite social norms that have traditionally 
restricted women’s participation in formal labour markets. As Naila Kabeer has pointed out:
it took market forces, and the advent of an export-oriented garment manufacturing industry, 
to achieve what a decade of government and non-government efforts had failed to do: to cre-
ate a female labour force of sufficient visibility, and on such a scale, that it could no longer be 
overlooked by official data gathering exercises.46
Increased female participation in the formal labour market has been a major economic factor 
driving social change. The garment industry has been a key driver of the ‘empowerment’ of 
women observed by many agencies within the country since the 1980s. The new garment 
factories drew mainly on the labour of village women who had learned traditional sewing 
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skills as young girls within rural households. These generations of young women have been 
able to challenge the constraints of kin and patriarchal social norms and shape new identities 
in settings beyond the village. Women report that they value the chance to earn their own 
living, gain a measure of independent purchasing power, be able to save and remit money 
to their families in the village, and secure more control over their choice of partner and date 
of marriage.47
Second, the case of the garment industry allows us to focus on the ‘big D’ dimensions of 
such changes. The garment sector has been the focus for a wide range of purposive inter-
ventions intended to promote positive change, or ameliorate harm, within the ‘little d’ arena 
of the industry’s development. Economic growth has come at a high social cost. Income and 
empowerment gains also need to be set against the generally harsh lives faced by garment 
workers in terms of poor working conditions, a lack of basic labour rights and high levels of 
violence against women.48 Other recent research points to significant health problems for 
workers, including high levels of stress and anxiety.49 ‘Big D’ responses have included char-
itable welfare projects by NGOs such as women’s health services in the form of health and 
nutrition training schemes, and the provision of childcare centres for garment worker 
children.
For example, Nari uddug Kendra (NuK) is a local NGO that has for more than 15 years 
undertaken advocacy with and provided services to garment workers. It works with factory 
management to draw up action plans that meet industry compliance standards in relation 
to fire safety and toilets facilities, provides hostels that offer employees secure low-cost 
dormitory accommodation, and trains workers in health, nutrition and gender rights. Phulki 
is another local organisation that runs day care centres for the children of garment workers, 
based on a self-designed model that has now been replicated by other local groups.50 
Contrasting with these types of welfare-oriented projects, there are also various rights-based 
civil society initiatives. These have included lobbying work in an attempt to raise labour 
standards, advocacy to improve transparency in international value chains, awareness train-
ing in relation to worker rights, and support for building workplace arrangements that can 
improve communication and strengthen dialogue between workers and managers.
Other forms of ‘big D’ intervention have originated in the for-profit business sector in the 
form of ‘corporate social responsibility’ and ‘ethical business’ initiatives. These follow from 
private sector claims that business wants to respond to social and environmental needs 
through the implementation of special programmes that go beyond its central ‘for profit’ 
motivation. These types of initiatives became more common following the horrific collapse 
of the Rana Plaza garment factory in 2013 that led to the death of 1134 factory workers and 
more than 2500 injuries. The tragedy received considerable international news coverage 
and brought the position of Bangladesh’s garment workers to the world’s attention as 
never before.
Clothing companies renewed and signalled their desire to pay more attention to the 
safety of garment workers and promised to improve transparency and accountability in the 
complex supply chains that structure garment exports. Two international industry coalitions 
were established to improve building and fire safety standards in Bangladesh’s factories on 
a voluntary basis, with European producers such as Primark and H&M signing up to the 
Accord on Fire and Building Safety (AFBS) (bringing a stricter inspection regime in more than 
1600 factories), and many of the uS companies choosing to sign up with a different inspec-
tion group called the Alliance for Bangladesh Worker Safety (ABWS). However, these efforts 
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have been far from effective. Three years after the collapse, it was reported that progress 
with the reforms has remained piecemeal and slow, with for example 70% of the AFBS group’s 
plans still behind schedule at the time of writing.51
By the end of 2017 these initiatives had run their course, reflecting the shifting balance 
of local and international interests. The Alliance stated that it would cease its activities by 
the end of 2018, and that safety-related activities would be taken over by a government 
scheme.52 By contrast, those behind the Accord announced that they would initiate a second 
phase beginning in 2019. The Bangladesh Garment Manufacturers and Exporters Association 
(BGMEA), the country’s leading business association, opposed the decision as externally 
driven and unaccountable. Its leader made a provocative comparison with the unilateralism 
of the British East India Company during the eighteenth century and, after additional gov-
ernment criticism, the High Court in late 2017 placed a freeze on the extension of the Accord. 
As a result of this pressure plans for the second phase of the Accord have now been aban-
doned. In its place, a new government scheme – known as Shonman (meaning ‘respect’ in 
the Bangla language) – is to be organised by the Office of the Prime Minister with an inde-
pendent ombudsman and participation from the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
Supporters of the new initiative claim it will be superior to the earlier ones, since it will 
broaden to include the majority of factories that were not covered. Its critics are sceptical 
about its viability, since there is no clear plan in place to pay for it.53
Finally, in line with Polanyi’s concept of the ‘double movement’, the garment sector is the 
focus of bottom-up forms of contestation and resistance and has long been an arena of 
political mobilisation. Formal trade union membership is restricted, so this has normally 
taken the form of small-scale protests that have occasional erupted into larger street level 
demonstrations and unrest. Work by Naomi Hossain and others posits a continuum between 
such everyday resistance around issues such as workplace lunch bills, housing rental fees, 
and water and gas supply charges levied in living quarters, through to larger-scale campaigns 
for increases in the monthly minimum wage that have resulted in regular strikes, stoppages 
and factory closures.54 Between 2008 and 2010 a series of informal worker protests for higher 
wages led to large-scale unrest that met with political violence in support of owners, con-
stituting one of the most significant examples of class-based mobilisation in the country for 
many years. The government eventually responded with a significant increase in the garment 
worker minimum wage in recognition of the political claims made. This type of action can 
be analysed in terms of a contestation of ‘little d’ development within ‘big D’ in Hart’s sense 
of embodying ‘non-reductionist understandings of class and power’,55 and seen as distinct 
from, and in some ways challenging, other forms of charitable or ameliorative ‘big D’ projects 
described above.
In the short term, such action is unlikely to lead to structural transformation or re-artic-
ulation of the kind hoped for in Hart’s analysis or Polanyi’s double movement. As Hossain 
points out, the country’s plentiful supply of garment labour means that the ‘industry is insu-
lated against pressures for welfare standards and skills in the short term’.56 With a monthly 
minimum wage of uS$68, Bangladesh’s garment workers nevertheless remain the low-
est-paid in the world, with their counterparts in China earning uS$280. Pressures for improved 
working conditions and labour standards that have been taking place since the late 2000s 
and the increased media visibility given to recent factory fires and collapses continues to 
provide stronger bargaining power for workers seeking to influence the material interests 
of employers through growing recognition of labour rights and factory safety. By 2013 
THIRD WORLD QuARTERLy 11
garment worker wages had trebled in less than five years, as the government recognised 
that the political settlement on which its power rested required an adjustment in response 
to actual and threatened instability.
The garment industry in Bangladesh is at the centre of a rapid and harsh reshaping of the 
country’s social order through an unfolding process of capitalist transformation, that has 
parallels with the processes of industrialisation in nineteenth century Europe. Here we can 
identify both ‘big D’ and ‘little d’ development, but rather than existing as distinct realms 
they are heavily entangled. For example, it was regulatory policy at the international level 
that opened the door to this transformation with the creation of the MFA (with these policies 
bringing both intended and unintended outcomes for Bangladesh) and the consequent 
movement of (initially) South Korean capital into the country, but the capitalist growth and 
transformation that was unleashed is primarily a form of ‘immanent’ development that 
remains largely unregulated. In line with Polanyi’s ‘double movement’ idea, cases of garment 
worker self-organisation, resistance and street protest reflect a set of contradictions as the 
newly dominant market principle erodes the social norms and institutions among a work-
force had been firmly embedded in rural village society a little more than a single genera-
tion ago.
The government’s oversight of the garment industry can be understood in the light 
of Rigg’s superscript Dd as the ‘driving and directing’ of the development state, in view 
of its centrality to the country’s export earnings and economic wellbeing. It can also be 
viewed as an example of the ‘trusteeship’ principle. The government knows that in order 
to maintain stability and ensure its own survival it must balance two sets of interests: it 
must pay close attention to the garment factory owner lobby and to the interests of 
foreign capital, but it must also take care to maintain a vision of minimum standards for 
workers in order to prevent instability and maintain order in the midst of rapid indus-
trialisation and urbanisation. Indeed, something close to the ‘trusteeship’ principle was 
invoked in an August 2017 speech by Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina when 
she reminded factory owners to pay more attention to the welfare of their employees, 
blamed NGOs for sowing dissent in the labour market, and urged the country’s garment 
workers to ‘not give in to the provocations of outsiders to cause workplace troubles’.57 
At the same time, the government’s gradual clampdown on wider civil society space is 
also being used to reinforce this trusteeship by making it harder for opposition to 
organise.58
5. The ‘D/d’ relationship as binary, continuum or dialectic?
As an ideal or pure type, in Max Weber’s sense of capturing the most rational and essential 
components of a social category, the ‘D/d’ distinction has conceptual value because it clarifies 
two different ways of understanding development, and provides a historicised framework 
for their analysis. However, when it comes to specifying the relationship between them, the 
case study suggests that there is less clarity. The relational aspect of the conceptualisation 
has received much less attention, and this section explores ways of thinking about the ‘D/d’ 
boundary, the relationship between the two dimensions and the role of policy at the interface 
of this relationship. Indeed, should we be speaking of two types of development or of two 
dimensions of the same process?
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One implication of making a ‘D/d’ distinction is that from a certain perspective they could 
be understood in binary terms as alternatives. This follows from the argument that if NGOs 
are to be more relevant, effective and sustainable, they need to focus on ‘little d’ rather than 
‘big D’, implying an ‘either/or’ choice. yet if we make too clear a distinction between ‘big D’ 
and ‘little d’, this could underplay the importance of the relationship between them. In Hart’s 
framing, it is clear that ‘big D’ serves the interests of ‘little d’. For example, the ‘big D’ activities 
of international and local NGOs that provide welfare to workers in the form of such as child-
care support, for example, underpins the work of international capital by ameliorating work-
ing conditions for low paid garment workers, diffusing dissent and maintaining the country’s 
position as provider of cheap labour.
Nor is it the case that ‘little d’ change simply unfolds according to a natural capitalist logic, 
since it is also subject to governance arrangements. In Bangladesh, international capital 
sought opportunities to operate and expand within the changing structures of the interna-
tional regulatory system during the 1970s and 1980s. Despite the elements of contingency 
and chance that were undoubtedly involved in its early years, global trade regulations con-
ditioned the international movement of this capital. A clear distinction between ‘big D/little 
d’ breaks down in the sense once we recognise the that there have been strong elements 
of intentionality – on the part of government and capital – associated with the state’s nur-
turing of the garment industry in Bangladesh. Development and change may be in some 
importance sense an immanent process, but its patterns are also outcomes of the tensions 
between ‘top-down’ forces in the shape of international and national level policies, and 
‘bottom-up’ forces of resistance and contention that bubble up from below.59
The risk of a dualist perspective makes it more difficult not only to think in terms of 
interconnectedness, but also in terms of systems. unless we focus on the relationship 
between the two types of development, we might face the kinds of problems with the ‘D/d’ 
distinction that emerged in the context of the concept of the ‘informal sector’ in the 1970s, 
first conceived by Keith Hart as part of an ILO study.60 The concept was soon recognised for 
its general utility, but once it was mapped onto other empirical realities and subjected to 
further theoretical scrutiny it began to attract criticism. For example, Jan Breman took the 
view that ‘by interpreting the relationship to the formal sector in a dualistic framework and 
in focusing on the mutually exclusive characteristics, we lose sight of the unity and totality 
of the productive system’.61 The concept has lived on in a general abstract sense, but it was 
not long before ‘the static dualist expression of two sectors, formal and informal, coexisting 
next to, but not with, each other was relegated firmly to the past’.62
Another potentially productive perspective on the Bangladesh case might suggest 
the value of a focus on the ‘big D’ and ‘little d’ relationship as a continuum. This would 
suggest points where they meet and interact, generating relationships and tensions from 
which change emerges in any given setting at a particular time. Development sociologist 
Norman Long’s actor-oriented approach offers a concept of ‘interface’ that could provide 
a methodology for analysing interactions and tensions among actors with multiple inter-
ests and rationalities.63 Originally conceived as a means for analysing ‘development inter-
vention’ (in the sense of ‘big D’), it could also be used to analyse the interconnectedness 
between both types. A related inference is made by Bakker and Nooteboom when they 
note that, ‘The “little d-development” approach … brings relational, unintended and bot-
tom-up factors into the process of development that “big D-development” seeks to 
control’.64
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This interface can also be approached through the broad conceptual lens of ‘policy’. Policy 
can be analysed not simply as something instrumental and imposed, but also as an arena 
of struggle.65 It can be understood as encompassing different scales, from the maintenance 
of global regulation regimes to the implementation regimes that exist at the ‘lower’ level of 
project or programme. The framing of policy as part of an interface between ‘D/d’ then makes 
it possible to pay more nuanced attention to the relationships between and within states, 
markets and citizens and to forms of contestation that are taking place. Such a view helpfully 
blurs the boundary between activities undertaken within the aid and agency worlds of ‘big 
D’, and those carried out by governments and corporate actors. The logic of separation 
between ‘big D’ and ‘little d’ as unfolding change becomes less stable, making the interactions 
across the ‘D/d’ divide clearer, where they are revealed as related dimensions of development 
rather than different types.
Bringing in the idea of policy as an arena of ideas and actions also makes it possible to 
focus more clearly on the state. A key element in understanding the relationship between 
‘big D’ and ‘little d’ is the capacity of the state to develop and implement its strategies in the 
face of global pressures and historically constituted local institutions. The capacity of the 
state itself to undertake effective policy can be therefore understood not only as part of ‘big 
D’, but also in part as an outcome of ‘little d’ development. For example, Theda Skocpol has 
drawn attention to the ‘challenging task of explaining the various capacities of states to 
implement their policies’ since these are shaped not just by the state officials who undertake 
goal formation but also by wider structural conditions, unforeseen reactions and unintended 
consequences. Such capacities are unevenly distributed across countries, regions and 
socio-political sectors. In other words, ‘little d’ development processes come into play under 
conditions in which there are ‘the broad institutional patterns of divergent national histories 
that explain why countries now have, or do not have, policy instruments for dealing with 
particular problems or crises’.66
While it is productive to explore binary and continuum perspectives on the ‘D/d’ relation-
ship, we cannot lose sight of Hart’s original framing of this as dialectic, in the sense of ‘the 
opposition of contradictory or opposite forces’.67 The main value of this conceptualisation 
is not that it offers choices to development agencies, but that it insists on a focus on struggles 
for alternative development. ‘Big D’ is intended to serve the interests of ‘little d’, but is resisted. 
Although ‘big D’ operates with a ‘depoliticizing intent’ (in the sense used by James Ferguson),68 
Hart concludes her analysis of post-apartheid South Africa with the hope that resistance will 
create ‘a revitalized politics to press for greater economic justice to realise the promises of 
democracy’.69 This chimes too with Cowen and Shenton’s call for alternative development 
approaches based on ‘the refusal of trusteeship’.70
6. Conclusion
This paper began by considering the problem of confusion around different understandings 
development as both intention and outcome, identified in the work of Cowen and Shenton 
and that of Gillian Hart. By distinguishing between two types of development, and by 
historicising the idea of development itself, the ‘D/d’ distinction has served as a useful 
heuristic device. It has proved durable in development studies in part because it is a practical 
framing concept, and in part because it has appealed to multiple constituencies, from 
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theorists focused on alternatives to neoliberalism, to practitioners seeking to improve the 
relevance of NGO work. yet the distinction poses problems when subjected to more detailed 
scrutiny and applied to a ‘real world’ case. The context of the Bangladesh garment industry 
highlights the ways ‘big D’ and ‘little d’ processes operate alongside each other, and the 
way the principle of trusteeship continues to inform government policy in the face of 
resistance and contention.
Returning our two original questions, how should we now proceed? The first question 
was whether the original utility of the ‘D/d’ distinction risks becoming stretched and losing 
coherence as a means of organising ideas about development? It certainly continues to be 
valuable by enabling a clearer focus on the politics of struggle and contestation around the 
post-1945 Western project of development in a general sense. But when applied empirically, 
problems become apparent. Despite its value in general terms as an ideal type, on closer 
scrutiny the relationship between ‘big D’ and ‘little d’ lacks clarity. One area where this is the 
case is the messy interface at the point where the two dimensions of development meet. The 
refinement provided by Rigg partly, though not completely, solves this problem by drawing 
attention to the point where developmental state meets bottom-up grassroots action. 
Another problem is how we should best understand the boundary between the aid system 
and policy more widely. ‘D/d’ goals become ambiguous among different actors as the dialectic 
between them unfolds. Two further insights emerge from this: the potential value of a concept 
such as Long’s ‘interface’ as a means for analysing such interactions, and the need for a critical 
understanding of policy as an arena of contestation around ‘D/d’ that enables us to go beyond 
aid and agencies to encompass local and international relationships around state and capital.
The second question was whether a conceptual distinction that emerged under specific 
historical conditions at the turn of the millennium can remain relevant today? As we move 
well beyond the period during which Hart was originally writing, its historicised approach 
to development is both a strength and a potential weakness. The mode of ‘big D’ operation 
is changing, with a marked shift in recent years among Western governments to move foreign 
aid ‘upstream’. For example, in 2013 the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
was closed, signalling a move away from the world of projects and programmes towards a 
view of development as the pursuit of broader foreign policy, trade and commercial inter-
ests.71 A similar trend has been observed in the uK, where foreign aid has become more 
closely linked with security and immigration. For example, Prime Minister Teresa May 
announced in 2018 that British aid would be used more explicitly to deepen trade ties with 
Africa through increased investment.72 A different form of self-interested ‘big D’ now seeks 
to influence ‘little d’ in new ways that move beyond the older mode of trusteeship.
Furthermore, the global balance of power in which Western dominance has been taken 
for granted has altered. The end of ‘big D’ development in Hart’s sense as Western hegemony 
may already have taken place. Western foreign aid is of decreasing importance to all but a 
few countries of the Global South. The possibility of rebalancing ‘big D’ development into a 
less Western and more ‘global’ project inclusive of a wider range of countries, ideas and 
approaches is becoming more real. The rise of China as a key player in development assis-
tance is an important part of this story. Finally, the uN’s Sustainable Development Goals, 
unlike the Millennium Development Goals they replaced, are now to be applied to the rich 
‘developed’ nations as well as the Global South, extending the idea of ‘Development’ well 
beyond its post-World War Two usage.
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In order to keep up with these changes, some suggest that we now need a universal 
framing of development in which the ‘structural prejudiced framing of development as a 
North–South issue needs to be removed’ and ‘reframed from narrowly tackling poverty and 
vulnerability, to navigating complex challenges in ways that reduce inequalities and build 
more sustainable, inclusive and secure futures for people and societies’.73 As we experience 
this transition, the ‘D/d’ distinction will continue to highlight the continuing vulnerability of 
certain countries and regions that remain disproportionately subject to the interventions 
of Western ‘big D’ development actors, but overall the traction of the ‘D/d’ distinction has 
weakened.
Trends in development move backwards as well as forwards. While these global shifts 
are taking place, we are also witnessing a return to a variant of the 1950s ‘development as 
modernisation’ paradigm, for example, in the form of ‘the conflation of GDP with develop-
ment, the focus on energy and transport infra-structures, agro-industrial productivity, 
resource extraction and, for some, an optimistic sense of forward momentum’.74 China’s 
increasing prominence as an aid donor also contributes to this trend, as does its establish-
ment of the new Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). A view of development as 
primarily an economic and technical process in which access to markets can be facilitated 
for marginalised groups, rather than as a process dominated by structural inequalities which 
requires redistributive outcomes, is a growing cause for concern.75 In the light of such regres-
sive shifts, Hart’s original motivation for advocating the ‘D/d’ distinction retains its relevance 
as citizens attempt to shape neoliberal globalism in support of more equitable and sustain-
able forms of development based on a deeper understanding of global and local political 
economy.
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